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The Movement of People
TRAVEL REFLECTED FLUCTUATIONS IN THE STATE OF BUSINESS
Expansions and contractions after 1908
Railroad travel, like freight traffic, has fluctuated in rough har-
mony with the general disturbances in the rest of the economy
outlined by the reference chronology. Begirming with the 1908—10
expansion (the first for which we have the more sensitive monthly
data), each phase of business can be matched with a corresponding
phase in passenger-miles (Chart 19'). For example, a few months
after the business contraction of 1920—21 began, travel started to
decline, and continued to do so during the remainder of the refer-
ence phase and for some time thereafter. (In this as in other in-
stances, the turning points in passenger traffic differed consider-
ably from those in the reference chronology). During the long
business expansion of 1933—37, to be sure, we have marked off
1Weestimated passenger-miles from July 1907 to February 1919 by dividing
approximate revenue per passenger-mile into aggregate passenger revenue. To
obtain monthly divisors we assumed that revenue per passenger-mile at the middle
of each year was the same as the average reported for the year as a whole, for 'all'
roads through 1910 and Class I thereafter. This assumption yielded estimates of
unit revenue for January 1, 1907 to 1916 and July 1, 1916 and 1917. We assumed
further that unit revenue changed between any successive two of these dates by
equal amounts every month; thus we obtained a figure for the beginning of each
month from January 1, 1907 to July 1, 1917. To get unit revenue for each month
we averaged the estimates for the beginning of that month and of the following
month.
In the period to which we applied this procedure, the resulting errors cannot
be large; it is fairly obvious from the annual data that the true (seasonally ad-.
justed) variations in unit revenue were slight. Effective June 10, 1918, however,
fares were sharply raised. Average revenue increased from 2.000 cents in 1917 to
2.414 cents in 1918. If we had raised the middle-of-1917 estimate by ofthe
difference each month, the resulting figures for all months before June 1918 would
be much too high. Instead, we assumed that from July 1, 1917 to June 1, 1918 unit
revenue changed at the same rate as from July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917. We took
2.540 eents, the average for 1919, a year in which, as in the remainder of
there was no general change, to be correct for the months July 1918 through
February 1919.
The general increase in fares became effective June 10. Our estimate for May
31, 1918 is 2.134 cents. We assumed that the June average equaled (2.134 cents +
2 X 2.540 cents)± 3.
43CHART 19
Passenger-miles, July 1907—December 1940; Noncommutation Passenger-miles, July 1921—December 1940
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not one but three phases in travel. Passenger traffic rose to a peak
in October 1934, then declined somewhat, and subsequently rose
to a final peak in March 1937. But the intermediate peak was not
as high as the final one, the intermediate trough not as low as the
initial one. It is fair to say that during 1933—37 as a whole there was
an expansion in travel corresponding to the reference phase.2 On
the other hand, we must admit that the last two specific expan-
sions in the 1920's, especially the very last, were extremely brief
and small.
What is true of passenger traffic as a whole is equally true of its
principal component, travel other than commuting. Beginning
with the 1921—23 expansion, the first for which we have data, there
was one specific phase for every reference phase (Chart 19). In
arriving at this judgment we again disregard a mild specific con-
traction during the long expansion of 1933—37.
'Otber than commutation' travel includes journeys in Pullman
cars, for which we have monthly data beginning early enough to
cover practically the entire 19 14—18 business expansion.a Here
again each reference phase can be matched by a specific phase.
A long expansion in Pullman passenger-miles, beginning before
and ending after the reference expansion of 19 19—20, is clearly
defined. Again, three phases in 1933—37 can justly be lumped into
a single longer phase corresponding to the business phase. The
1914—18 expansion presents a somewhat similar situation. Chart
20 suggests that there was a trough somewhat before January
1915, lower than the trough we have marked in January 1916.
This is exactly what we find in data on the revenue of the Pullman
Company, which go back somewhat further. We conclude that
there was a long rise from late 1914 to November 1917 which, al-
though interrupted, corresponds to the 1914—18 reference phase.
2Asimilar long rise, temporarily interrupted by a mild decline, occurred in many
:.
however,to win recognition in the reference chronology, whose architects discuss
the problem on pp. 8—90 of Zvlea.surin.g Business Cycles. We consider the sharp
rise and fall of traffic in 1933 too brief to be called a cycle.
Pullman passenger-miles,unlike noncommutationand total passenger-miles,
a...#.s A
accommodationthe Pullman Company is paid, although no railroad fares are
charged. The original data are from the Survey of Current Business, January
1939, and, subsequent issues.CHART 20
Pulhmrn Passenger-miles, January 1915—December 1941
Million passenger-miles
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Changes in the rate of growth or decline of commuting
It is less obvious that there are fluctuations in commutation travel
corresponding to those in business. We can see few clearly defined
peaks and troughs (Chart 21); we feel unable to mark off specific
cycles. Consequently, we cannot say thatevery reference phase
was matched by a specific phase. But every comparison of ad-
joining phases suggests positive conformity (Table 11). In 1926—27
commuting did not decline; but the curve is flatter than in the
neighboring expansions. In 1933—37 it declined,on the whole, but
not as rapidly as in 1929—33 or 1937—38.
CHART 21
Commutation Passenger-miles, July 1921—December 1940
Milltonpassenger—miles
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Shaded periods are reference contractions.
Onthe other hand, it is somewhat curious that commuting did
notdecline appreciably between the 1926—27 reference In
the decade after 1920, however, this kind of trafficwas subject not
only to changes in the prosperity of actualor potential commuters
but also to another influence. During the 1920's althoughnot
during the '30's, the population of suburbanareas, and presum-
In the figures as we compute them, there is no change at all, but the seasonal
correction does not have hairline precision; furthermore, a slight modification in
the dates compared would yield a somewhat different result.48 CHAPTER 2
ably the number of potential commuters, grew rapidly. Almost all
commuters ride to and from one or another of a few large centers.
The number of trips into and out of New York City alone was
about 35 per cent of the national total in the early '20's and about
50 per cent in the late The population of the New York
metropolitan area, outside the large central cities, increased 52
per cent from 1920 to 1930; only 10 per cent from 1930 to 1940.
Likewise, the population of the area surrounding Chicago proper
increased 73 per cent in the first decade but only 12 per cent in the
second.6 The migration to the suburbs may have gone on, at a
diminished rate, in the mild contraction of 1926—27; if so, it would
account for the stability of the traffic.
Table 11
Commutation Passenger-miles
Change per Month between Reference Peaks and Troughs, 1929—1938
Change from preceding date
Per month
Monthsc
Reference date Level of from Total To To
business prec. peak trough




May1923Peak 20 537 48 2.40
July1924Trough 14 534 —3 ... —0.21
Oct.1926Peak 27 556 22 0.81
Dec.1927Trough 14 556 0 ... 0.00
June1929Peak 18 575 19 1.06
March 1933Trough 45 360 —215 ... —4.78
May1937Peak 50 348 —12 —0.24
May1938Trough 12 320 —28 . —2.33
t Three-month average; reference date is middle month.
It is also remarkable that commuting should have declined, even
slightly, during 1933—37, when other kinds of travel and economic
activity at large were showing pronounced recovery. But after
1929 many highway improvements,especiallydesignedto
Percentages computed from ICC figures for the United States and data in Rail-
road and Ferry Traffic in and out of New York City (Franchise and Tariff Bureau,
Transit Commission, State of New York, mimeographed, 1939), p. 13, and earlier
issues.
6Computedfrom data in Metropolitan Districts (Census Bureau, 1930), pp. 49,
141, and releases on population and housing (1940), Series PH-i, iii, 137.PilE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 49
facilitate the flow of motor traffic in a metropolitan region, were
made in and around New York, and no doubt in other commuting
areas. Some were completed during 1933—37. They enhanced the
relative attractiveness of driving to work. Even if a traveller chose
to go to and from his job by railroad, it was no longer as advan-
tageous to buy a commutation ticket rather than pay for each
trip separately. Other fares had been greatly reduced; conimuta-
tion fares had not changed much. In 1933—37 ordinary fare ex-
ceeded commutation fare by about 1 cent per mile; in earlier
expansions the spread was 2 cents (Chart 22). Under some cir-
cumstances the difference was nominal. The average commutation
fare per mile is computed on the assumption that purchasers of
monthly tickets make full use of them. Some persons had occasion
to go into town only two or three times a week or preferred to drive
in good weather. For them the price of a monthly ticket, divided
by the number of trips actually taken, may have exceeded the new
low level of noncommutation fares. Some travel was probably di-
verted to the 'other' category. Finally, migration to the suburbs
did not add to the number of potential daily riders as rapidly as in
the 1920's. All these factors help to explain the absence of any
marked expansion in commuting.
CHART 22
Revenue per Passenger-mile: Commutation























Shaded periods are reference
Earliertimes
The annual totals on which we are obliged to rely before 1908
suggest an almost continuous growth of travel from 1882 to that
year (Chart 23). They disclose oniy 2 specific declines, from 1894
to 1895 and from 1896 to 1897, although Burns and Mitchell
find 8 reference contractions in this period. Monthly figures, of
course, might indicate more numerous interruptions. However
that may be, 11 comparisons among reference phases suggest
positive, only 4 inverse conformity (Table 12). There is also
an annual statistical record, even older, of the number of journeys
people took in Pullmans, although not of the number of miles they
traveled.7 Between 1875 and 1915 (when the monthly Pullman
data became available) it reveals only 6 shrinkages (1876—78,
1885—86, 1891—92, 1893—95, 1896—97, 1914—15) although this
long span includes 10 complete reference contractions and the
three later years of another, 1873—78 (Chart 24). Thirteen rate-
of-change comparisons count on the side of positive, 7 on that
We are indebted to the Pullman Company for most of the figures. The ones we
use pertain to the years ended July 31, 1875—1916, and to calendar years beginning
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of inverse conformity (Table 13). Thus most of the more clumsy
evidence from annual data suggests that in earlier times travel
usually conformed positively to the changes in business at large
indicated by the monthly chronology, as it did afterwards.
Table 13
Pullman Journeys
Change per Year between Reference Peaks and Troughs, 187.8—1918
Change from preceding date
Per year
Years
Reference Level of from No. of T tal To To Conformity




1878 Trough ... 1,118...
1882 Peak 4 1,860 742 186
1885 Trough 3 2,672 812... 271 Inverse
1887 Peak 2 2,892 220 110... Inverse
1888 Trough 1 3,250 358 ... 358Inverse
1890 Peak 2 4,6891,439 720... Positive
1891 Trough 1 4,949 260 ... 260Positive
1893 Peak 2 5,278 329 164... Inverse
1894 Trough 1 4,898—380 ... —380Positive
1896 Peak 2 4,677 —221 —110... Positive
1897 Trough 1 4,414—263 ... —263Positive
1900 Peak 3 7,1642,750 917 ... Positive
1901 Trough 1 8,9211,757... 1,757 Inverse
1903 Peak 2 11,4072,486 1,243... Inverse
1904 Trough 1 12,336 929 ... 929Positive
1907 Peak 3 16,874 4,538 1,513 ... Positive
1908 Trough 1 17,453 579 ... 579 Positive
1910 Peak 2 20,210 2,757 1,378 ... Positive
1911 Trough 1 21,655 1,445 ... 1,445 Inverse
1913 Peak 2 24.,864 3,209 1,604 ... Positive
1915 Trough 2 24,252—612 .. —306 Positive
1918 Peak 3.5 28,751 4,499 1,285 ... Positive
j By comparison with preceding rate; e.g., 271 thousand with 186 thousand.
Netgains from cycle to cycle until 1920, losses afterward
While there may have been more contractions in travel before
1920 than our annual figures show, it is clear that, whatever pas-
senger business the companies may have lost during such a period,
they usually gained not only as much but more during the subse-
quent expansion. At almost every reference peak, certainly, more
people rode the railroads than at any preceding reference peak.
After on the other hand, the losses in each contraction wereTHE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 53
never fully recovered in the following expansion.8 The improve-
ment of highways and motor cars was the principal reason for this
cumulation of losses.
CHART 25
Numberof Months by which Turn in Passenger-
miles Preceded (—)orFollowed( +) Reference Turn
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TURNINGPOINTS
Peaks and troughs in travel usually occurred some time before or
after the reference dates to which we regard them as correspond-
ing (Chart 25)Manyof these differences can apparently be ex-
plained by circumstances peculiar to each case or by the growth
of highway competition.
SInWorld War II, however, after the last cycle to close in time for discussion here,
military requirements and gasoline shortages temporarily raised rail travel to
levels far higher than any previous record.
As far as we can tell from the more limited data, when the turn in total passenger..
miles preceded that in business, so did the turn in Pullman and noncommutation
passenger-miles; when the turn in the total followed, so did the turn in Pullman
and noncommutation. The only known exception is 1924, when Pullman reached
bottom 6 months ahead of the reference turn, although noncommutation and total
did not do so until 9 months after it. In other instances the length of the interval
differed somewhat from one kind of travel to another.54 CHAPTER 2
Effectofwar conditions
The 1918 high point in traffic preceded the reference peak by 3
months. The following trough came in October 1918 although the
corresponding business turn is placed in the following April. War
conditions seem to account for the earliness of both specific turns.
In the earlier months of United States participation in the war,
prosperity and the more numerous occasions for doing business
with the government no doubt stimulated a growing number of
civilian journeys. There was of course a large increase in military
travel. The combination of influences produced a sharp rise in
total passenger-miles in the latter half of 1917. The expansion of
both passenger and freight traffic threatened to overburden the
railroads. After the government took over operations at the end of
the year, it endeavored to discourage civilian patronage, partly by
exhortation,'° and partly by running fewer trains as well as fewer
parlor, dining, and sleeping cars for civilian passengers." Travel
became inconvenient and uncomfortable as well as unpatriotic.
Military movement was large enough, however, to raise the total,
after a brief sag, to the peak in May. After that, while the restric-
tions on civilians continued in effect, army travel declined, at least
in the last month of the reference phase (Chart 26) •12
Theinfluenza epidemic which broke out in the autumn of 1918,
and which must have kept many potential travelers at home, was
worst in October. Thereafter it became progressively
"Beginning with the signing of the Armistice and continuing
throughout the year 1919 much of the passenger service...(pre-
viously) curtailed was People who had refrained
'°See,e.g., the statement issued by the Railroad Administration and cited in
W. J. Cunningham, American Railroads: Government Control and Reconstruction
(A. W. Shaw Co., 1922), p. 89.
11WalkerD. Hines, War History of the American Railroads (Yale University
Press, 1928), P. 89; Cunningham, p. 90.
12Pullmanpassenger-miles reached their peak much earlier, in Nov. 1917, as one
might expect from the special restrictions on the kind of equipment used by this
traffic.
13Mortalityrates from influenza per 100,000 population in 35 cities, raised to an
annual basis, were: Aug., 2; Sept., 80; Oct., 1,774; Nov., 513; Dec., 445; Jan., 412;
Feb., 204 Mar., 162; April, 66; May, 24 (Mortality from Influenza and Pneumonia
in 50 Large Cities of the United States, 1910—1929, U. S. Public Health Service Re-
prints, Report 1415, p. 6).
14Hines,War History.. ., p.89.THE MOVEMENTOF PEOPLE 55
from traveling could now indulge any deferred plans in less dis-
comfort and without any fear of obstructing the war. From July
to November the number of soldier passengers declined; after the
Armistice the soldiers began to come home in increasing number,
although the movement again declined somewhat in January and
February (Chart 26)Conditionsother than the state of business
thus favored an increase of both civilian and military travel for
several months before April 1919.
CHART 26
Soldier Journeys, July 1918—June 1920
1111 IIIIliii111111 1liii IILI
1918 1919 1920
Effectof motor competition
Between 1924 and 1938 peaks in travel regularly preceded peaks
in business, and troughs in travel, except in 1933 (and except for
an unaccountable Pullman trough in 1924) came after troughs in
business. Passenger traffic began to decline before business turned
downward and continued to decline for some time after business
turned upward.
of
holiday.Railway travel is typically sold for cash rather thanon
credit. When depositors could not withdrawmoney from their
accounts it is understandable that this particular kind of expendi-










As previously noted, the growing attraction of the highways was
operating to decrease rail travel during the entire period covered
by our monthly data. When any form of economic activity is sub-
ject to a continuously depressing influence we often find that it
turns downward earlier than business and goes on declining for
some time after business turns upward. This seems to have been
the case with travel between 1924 and 1938, with the explainable
exception in 1933.
Turns normally late?
We are left with a group of 5 turns before the war and 3 after it
the dates of which are not accounted for by competition or by ob-
vious special circumstances. All 4 of the peaks in traffic came later
than those in business; 2 of the troughs coincided with reference
turns, 2 came later, none earlier. The inference,if any, to
be drawn from this fragile evidence is that, when changes in
business are the only important influence at work, turning points
in travel are likely to come late in the procession.
LONGER JOURNEYS (BurrSHORTERCOMMUTING TRIPS) IN
PROSPERITY
The level of passenger-miles depends partly on how often people
undertake journeys and partly on how far they go. Business
ditions can affect the amount of travel by influencing either the
number or the length of trips.
Fluctuations after 1921 in the number of trips were similar in
a general way to those in passenger-miles. Noncommutation jour-
neys show a strong downwarft trend from 1921 to 1933. There were
specific phases for all reference phases, but the specific expansions
corresponding to the reference periods 1924—26 and 1927—29 were
very brief and mild. Specific cycles in the commutation data are
again hard to find. The number of commuting trips was much
lower after 1929—33 than before. Both kinds of journey conformed
positively to the reference chronology (Table 14).
On the whole the average length of journeys has increased since
1921, when the data begin, both in expansion and, to a large ex-
tent, in contraction (Charts 27 and 28). The progressive extension
and improvement of highway facilities contributed toward this
result. When contemplating a short trip, people were more likelyTHE MOVEMENTOF PEOPLE 57
to choose automobile in preference to rail transport than when con-
sidering a long one. Driving a car may be a relief and a pleasure
for a few hours; over long stretches a cumulative strain develops,
the prospect of which is a deterrent. Automobiletrips of great
length almost necessitate an overnight stop with loss of time and
lodging expense. Travel by bus for long distances was also very
uncomfortable. Highway improvement eliminated short rail trips
more rapidly than long ones, and thus tended to raise the average
length. 16
Table 14
Noncommutation and Commutation Journeys
t Three-month average; reference date is middle month.
other than commutation
.,1, .
-v.p . J rosemore expa m
andsometimes even declinedin the latter, especially during the
later stagesofthe 1929—33contraction.
We infer that when the incomes ofpeople whoare inclined to
travelbyrail forpieasureare increasing, they take not only more
'...Aa...
I .rTh - pr-I- P
-
I.
they take not only fewer but shorter ones. A similar tendency, we
16 Andther possible circumstance bearing especially on commuting may be cited.
Later corners to the suburban areas may have established their homes farther and
farther from town as earlier arrivals pre-empted the nearer sites.
















































































































The average for journeys,however,58 CHAPTER 2
surmise,is present in travel for business purposes. When the size
and frequency of orders is increasing, it may be thought worth
while to send salesmen farther and farther to obtain them. When
the business obtainable per trip is declining, some of the longer
trips may cease to pay for themselves.
CHART 27













Shadedperiods are reference contractions.
CHART 28
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If highway transport had not been greatly improved during the
period, the average would probably have increased in expansions
and fallen in contractions. As things were, the average tended to
rise in expansions both because highway development was elim-.
mating the shorter rail trips and because improving business con-
ditions were adding to the longer ones. In contraction the in-
fluence of business conditions opposed that of highway improve-
ment.
In arriving at these conclusions we ignore a sharp rise during the
first few months of the 1933—37 reference phase; the average tem-
porarily ascended to levels much higher than those which pre-
vailed afterward. In those months the activities of the federal
government were greatly expanded by the establishment of the
New Deal agencies. Many people went to Washington looking for
jobs; when they got them they brought their families. Business
men had numerous occasions for going to the capital or to regional
offices in connection with the new laws and their administration.
Although the persons involved may have been few in comparison
with other travelers they came from all parts of the country; their
journeys were long. The World Fair at Chicago may have stimu-
lated an unusual amount of long-distance travel. It was open from
late in May to the middle of November 1933. It was open also
during a roughly similar period in 1934; but paid admissions were
only 16,486 thousand in the 1934 season, 22,566 thousand in the
preceding season. In both the peak attendance came near the end
of August.17 (Our seasonal adjustment would not discount a non-
recurring fluctuation like this.) The maximum excess above the
underlying slope of the curve, about 16 miles, does not seem too
great to be explained in this manner.'8
The effect of changes in general economic conditions on the
length of commutation journeys seems to be the opposite of their
effect on other travel (Chart 28). The average trip lengthened
more rapidly during contractions than during expansions. Resi-
dents of the suburbs who live relatively close to the center of a
metropolitan area can often reach it by bus or trolley. These al-
ternatives are usually more inconvenient and time-consuming but
Seethe weekly figures in A Century of Progress, Report of the President of the
Board of Trustees, March 14, 1936.
Theeffect of New Deal activities and the Fair on travel helps also to account for
the promptness of its revival after the reference trough.60 CHAPTER 2
cheaper. The farther out one lives, the greater the inconvenience
and loss of time. It seems likely that in contractions, more of those
who have short distances to travel drop out of the ranks of corn-
muters than of those who live farther away.
Table 15
•Length of Journeys of Noncommutation Passengers and of Commuters
Change per Month between Reference Peaks and Troughs, 1921—1938
t Three-month average; reference date is middle month.
On Chart 28 there is no clear contrast between the contraction
of 1926—27 and its adjacent expansions. Our usual method of com-
puting the rate of change also fails to indicate any difference. The
computed growth during the 1921—23 expansion was less rapid
of 1923-24, however; and growth
1927—29 was less rapid than in the following contraction
(Table 15).
Since commutingaccountsfor a minor partof allpassenger-
miles, changes in the average length of all journeys are more likely
to resemble those in other than commutation travel. Beginning
with the 1919—20 expansion, comparisons of each phase with the
following,using annual data,suggest in each case that the net
effect of declining business is to shorten, and of improving business
to lengthen, journeys. When there was a shortening in both phases,














































































































than during the contraction
duringTHE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 61
in both, it was more rapid in expansion. Comparisons for earlier
periods, however, do not, as a whole, indicate any consistent re-
lation. Before 1896 they suggest that improving business tended
to shorten and declining business to lengthen journeys (Table 16).
Annual data for Pullman travel, beginning with 1918, show
positive conformity without exception (Table 17).
Table 16
Length of Journeys, All Passengers
Change per Year between Reference Peaks and Troughs, 1882—1938
Change from preceding date
Per year
Years Length
Reference Level of from T To To Conformity




1882 Peak ... 26.60
1885 Trough 3 25.99 —0.61... —0.20
1887 Peak 2 24.68 —1.31—0.66 ... Inverse
1888 Trough 1 24.79 0.11... 0.11 Inverse
1890 Peak 2 25.04 —0.74—0.37 ... Inverse
1891 Trough 1 23.95 —0.10... —0.10 Inverse
1890 Peak ... 24.06 ...
1891 Trough 1 24.18 0.12... 0.12
1893 Peak 2 23.97 —0.21—0.10 ... Inverse
1894 Trough 1 26.43 2.46... 2.46 Inverse
1896 Peak 2 25.50 —0.93—0.46"... Inverse
1897 Trough 1 24.05 —0.46... —0.46 Inverse
1900 Peak 3 27.80 2.76 0.92 ... Positive
1901 Trough 1 28.58 0.78... 0.78Positive
1903 Peak 2 30.10 1.520.76 ... Inverse
1904 Trough 1 30.64 0.54... 0.54Positive
1907 Peak 3 31.72 1.080.36 ... Inverse
1908 Trough 1 32.86 1.14... 1.14Inverse
1910 Peak 2 33.50 0.64 0.32 ... Inverse
1911 Trough 1 33.48 —0.02... —0.02 Positive
1913 Peak 2 33.31 —0.17—0.08 ... Inverse
1915 Trough 2 32.95 —0.36... —0.18 Positive
1918 Peak 3.5 38.48 5.53 1.58 ... Positive
1919 I 3S.CS 0.20... 0.20
1920 Peak 1 37.30 —1.38—1.38 ... Inverse
1921 Trough 1 35.53 —1.77 .. —1.77 Positive
1923 Peak 2 37.97 2.44 1.22 ... Positive
1924 Trough 1 38.26 0.29... 0.29 Positive
1926 Peak 2 40.79 2.53 1.26 ... Positive
1 10.23 0.5G...
1929 Peak 2 39.63 —0.60—0.30 ... Positive
1932 Trough 3 35.36 —4.27... —1.42 Positive
1937 Peak 5 49.42 14.06 2.81 ... Positive
1938 Trough 1 47.65 —1.77... —1.77 Positive
By comparison with preceding rate; e.g., —0.66 miles with —0.20 miles.
bMoreexactly, —0.465.62 CHAPTER2
Table17
Length of Pullman Journeys





































































































f Computed by NBER,: passenger-miles± number of passengers. Passenger-miles,
1932 and prior, from Survey of Current Business, Jan. 1939; subsequently, like all
figures for number of passengers, from Statistics of Railways, various issues.
CYCLES IN TRAVEL RATHER MILD
Milder than in industrial production
Travel is not only largely a service to consumers but, like all
services, is perishable. Production and consumption are simul-
taneous. Travel is analogous to the production of perishable
consumer goods, generally regarded as one of the forms of econ-
omic activity least affected by cyclical changes in business. Are
the changes in travel that correspond to changes in business also
relatively mild? To answer the question roughly we compare
changes in travel with those in the Federal Reserve index of
industrial production (Table 18), which reflects the production of
many kinds of articles—producer and consumer, durable and
nondurable. Since it includes the extremely variable durable
goods, presumably the cyclical changes in it are greater than those
in the production of perishable consumer goods and services. If
travel changes rather little as business changes, the amplitude of
its fluctuations should be less than that of fluctuations in the
Reserve index.f;'om three-month averages with month shown as middle month.
Data froa Board of of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Index of Industrial Production, 1943, P. 24.
bFebruary1)13, peak ir. Babson estimates, taken as such in computing this percentage.
Table 18
Total, Nc and Pullman Passenger-miles; Industrial Production; and Ton-miles




























































% change % change % change
from Date from Date from
prec. date proc. date prec. date
Oct. 1918 ... Mar.1919
Aug. 1020 55 Feb. 1020 22
Dec. 1921 —29 Apr. 1921 —32
17 Sept. 1923 25 May 1923 62
—14 Jan. 1924 —4 July 1924 —16
8 Nov. 1925 14 Oct. 1926 29
—20 Nov. 1928 —6 Nov. 1927 —6
3 Mar. 1929 5 Aug. 1929 23
—62 Mar. 1933 —65 July 1932 —52
120 Mar. 1937 87 May 1937 122






































If we look at the period from 1918 to 1926, we get the impression
that this is true. Specific fluctuations in production were regularly
greater, percentagewise, than those in traffic. This impression is
strengthened by the fluctuations between 1932 and 1938. On the
other hand, if we confine our attention to the partly overlapping
period from 1924 to 1937, we get a quite different picture. During
expansions, to be sure, variations in industrial output are greater
than those in travel; but the two specific contractions in the latter
were greater than those in the former. This period suggests
merely that the growth of highway competition restricted the
rise in passenger-miles during expansions, and accentuated the
fall during contractions. Had this factor been absent, the re-
coveries in employment, income, and occasions for business
travel might, for all the data tell us, have evoked a larger increase
in travel than occurred in production.
CEART 29


















Shaded periods are reference contractions.THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 65
We can form a more conclusive opinion, however, by examining
the ratio of passenger-miles to production (Chart 29). Generally
speaking, from 1919 onward, it fell in expansion, rose in con-
traction. Again we are confronted with exceptions in the same two
phases—the ratio fell in 1926—27 and 1929—33 as well as in their
bordering expansions. But the fall was less rapid during the two
contractions. The deceleration suggests that, although highway
competition tended to reduce rail travel in these as in other
phases, the general economic developments that occur in con-
traction retarded the rate of decline, and that those develop-
ments, unopposed, would have brought a rise in the ratio. This
means that passenger-miles would not have diminished as much
as the Federal Reserve index. From the unbroken inverse con-
formity of the ratio, we may reasonably infer that travel is
cyclically more stable than the output of industrial commodities,
although its relative stability was obscured at times by non-
cyclical influences.
Milder than in freight traffic
Travel is also more stable than the movement of commodities by
rail. Fourteen of 16 specific variations in ton-miles were greater
than the corresponding specific variations in passenger-miles
(Table 18). In view of the large number of cases, we need not be
much concerned with the two exceptions. They are similar to
those discussed in the preceding section.
Since annual data up to 1908 disclose only 3 specific phases
(from 1894 to 1897) in travel, few comparisons between specific
pha.ses in passenger-miles and in ton-miles are possible. But the
ratio of the former to the latter is suggestive. It fell in all reference
expansions except one, rose in 5 of 8 contractions (Table 19).
Even when it failed to change in the direction opposite to that of
business, it conformed inversely, with one exception. Travel
apparently tended to be more stable than the movement of
freight. If we had monthly data, and if they revealed more
two of (ns they
probably would), it seems likely that the rises and falls in ton-
miles would prove to have exceeded those in passenger-miles.66 CHAPTER 2
Table19
Passenger-miles per 100 Ton-miles
Change per Year between Reference Peaks and Troughs, 1882—1910
Change from preceding date
Years Per year
Reference Level of from P-rn. per





1882 Peak ... 19.56
1885 Trough 3 18.58 —0.98 ... —0.33
1887 Peak 2 17.17 —1.41 0.70
1888 Trough 1 17.11 —0.06 ... —0.06
1890 Peak 2 15.81 —1.30 0.65
1891 Trough 1 16.40 0.59 ... 0.59
1890 Peak ... 15.55
1891 Trough 1 15.84 0.29 ... 0.29
1893 Peak 2 15.20 —0.64 —0.32
1894 Trough 1 17.79 2.59 ... 2.59
1896 Peak 2 13.69 —4.10 —2.05
1897 Trough 1 12.88 —0.81 ... —0.81
1900 Peak 3 11.33 —1.55 —0.52
1901 Trough 1 11.80 0.47 ... 0.47
1903 Peak 2 12.07 0.27 0.14
1904 Trough 1 12.56 0.49 ... 0.49
1907 Peak 3 11.72 —0.84 —0.28
1908 Trough 1 13.32 1.60 ... 1.60
1910 Peak 2 12.68 —0.64 —0.32
Commutingmore stable than other travel
Since we feel unable to mark off specific phases in commuting, we
have nothing to compare directly with the specific phases in
other travel. But again a ratio is helpful—in this instance that of
'other' to total passenger-miles (Table 20). It rose in the ex-
pansion and fell in the contraction of the 1933—38 reference
cycle. From 1921 to 1933, however, it fell in both kinds of phase.
But the rate of decline was uneven. Without exception it was
faster in the contractions than in the expansions.
During these six earlier phases, the commutation business of
the railroads was probably less vulnerable to highway com-
petition than other passenger travel. The former, to be sure,
involved quite short distances. But the highway alternative, if
suburban residents were to go to and from business in their own
cars, was a twice-daily grind of driving through congested metro-
politan roads and streets at rush hours. One great disadvantage of
rail travel as compared with riding in one's own car—the necessityThE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 67
of subordinating personal convenience to railroad timetables—
was not a serious deterrent to commuting, for in this service
trains were frequent and schedules were adjusted to the hours of
doing business. Metropolitan highway conditions also discouraged
daily travel in busses by limiting their possible speed. Rail
commutation fares amounted to little over a cent per mile—less
than the out-of-pocket cost of driving, at least for one person per
car. The increasing attractions of the highways tended to cause a
greater decline in other passenger traffic than in commuting.
The growing popularity of suburban life also tended to increase
the latter relatively to the former.
Table 20
Ratio of Noncommutation to Total Passenger-miles
Change per Month between Reference Peaks and Troughs, 1921—1938
Change from preceding date
Months Per month
Reference date Ratiof




Sept. 1921 Trough... .8388
May 1923 Peak 20 .8298 .0090 —.0004
July1924Trough 14 .8220 —.0078 ... — .0005
Oct.1926Peak 27 .8129 —.0091 —.0003
Dec. 1927Trough 14 .7958 —.0171 ... — .0012
June 1929Peak 18 .7784 —.0174 —.0009
Mar. 1033 Trough 45 .6886 —.0898 ... — .0020
May 1037Peak 50 .8315 .1429 .0029
May 1938 Trough 12 .8251 —.0064 ... — .0005
t Three-month average; reference date is middle month.
But these tendencies were apparently opposed in expansion,
reinforced in contraction, since the decline in the ratio was less
rapid in the rising phase of business. In the absence of the compli-
'L#CA. £A..AA.S. Si Si V '5.1V. .. .... .1'
havecaused a rise in the ratio during expansion, a fall in con-
traction. Since commuting conformed to business as matters were,
it presumably would have risen and fallen with business. Since the
rat:io too wouia haver;sen
increased and diminished more than commuting.
The lesser sensitivity of commuting to business disturbances is
probably linked with the economic position of commuters and68 CHAPTER 2
the not easily dispensable part a railroad plays in their daily lives.
Most of them probably enjoy rather steady employment. As
long as they keep their jobs and homes they must travel to and
from cities, although, as noted elsewhere, some probably use less
expensive means of transport in hard times.
Not much difference between other coach and Pullman traffic
The specific expansions in Pullman passenger-miles were not
consistently greater or consistently smaller than those in non-
commutation passenger-miles, which aretotalsof noncom-
mutation coach movement and the part of the Pullman move-
ment that pays rail fares as well as berth or seat charges—the
major portion (Table 18). In 4 phases the percentage change in
Pullman traffic was larger, in 4 less than in the total.
But the relative changes in all these phases, except perhaps
1937—38, can plausibly be explained in terms of factors other than
general business conditions. Pullman journeys are longer, on the
average, than journeys in day coaches. In 1922 the average
journey, other than commutation, was 55 miles. The average
journey in Pullmans was 370 Since people are more
likely to prefer highway to rail transport for a short journey than
for a long one, the multiplication and improvement of roads and
motor vehicles at first diverted coach more than Pullman travel.
The lesser vulnerability of the latter could cause it to increase
more in expansions and to decline less in contractions, as it did
from 1921 to 1929.
The greater decline in Pullman from 1929 to
1933 may be the consequence of a change in the relative fares.
In this contraction passenger fares were but, on the
average, substantially reduced (Chart 22). During most of the
period reductions were not made according to any comprehensive
plan; the decline in the average may be attributed to scattered,
local experiments with lower fares as a means of regaining traffic.
19Itis true that when a passenger rides continuously over several railroads, each
counts him as a passenger, and the figure of 55 miles is therefore too low to repre-
sent the average completed journey.But the journey as a whole can hardly in-
volve more than 2 or at most 3 railroads. Travel between New York and Chicago
usually involves the use of but one railroad, many trans-continental trips only 3.
As the 55-mile figure includes Pullman travel, the average for coach travel would
be lower.THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 69
No detailed information about individual reductions is available,
but it seems possible that coach fares were more severely and
man travel.
CHART 30
Jlatio of Pullman to Noncommutation Passenger-miles, July 1921—De-
cember 1940
The process of cutting fares culminated in the reduction of the
basic charges during the expansion of 1933—37. While both
Pullman and other fares were reduced, the differential cost to
the traveler of Pullman as compared with coach journeys in-
creased (Table 21)Thewidening of the margin may explain the
20Abasic fare is an amount in cents per mile ordinarily used over a wide area to
construct the actual fares. Because of excursions, vacation fares, application of
short-line fares over longer competing routes, etc., the average revenue per pas-
senger-mile is usually less than the basic fare. Of the competitive reductions after
a the collective effect was substantial.
Chart 22 therefore shows earlier reductions than Table 21.
Equalization of rates over circuitous routes, lower charges in upper berths and
chair cars, and other factors reduce the average revenue of the Pullman Company
to a level below the basic charge.
extensively cut than Pullman fares.
limited the decline in coach more
If so, the reductions may have
effectively than that in Pull-
Ralto
.70
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Table 21—Concluded
Pootnotes to Table 21
History of basic fares from ICC Bureau of Statistics, Passenger Revenue
and Passenger-Miles (Statement 4037, mimeographed, 1940), and that of basic
Pullman charge arid surcharge from 214 ICC 174 (decided 1936), Passenger Fares
and Surcharges and 227 ICC 644, Increased Pullman Fares and Surcharges, 1937
(decided 1938). On the nature of a basic fare, see text, note 20.
aChangeseffective only on parts of Southern Railway.
bChangeseffective only on Southern Railway.
Changes effective only on Louisville & Nashville, Mobile and Ohio, Nashville,
Chattanooga, & St. Louis, and Central of Georgia.
dPullmanfare plus Pullman charge for berth or seat of 0.72 cents through July 31,
1938, and 0.756 cents beginning August 1; plus, also, Pullman surcharge of 0.36
cents through November 30, 1933 in South and West, and May 31, 1936 in East.
epuilman cost minus coach fare.
Table 22
Ratio of Pullman to Noncommutation Passenger-miles
Change per Month between Reference Peaks and Troughs, 1921—1938
Change from preceding date
Months Per month
+ Levelof from D a Coaformit e business prec. a0 suggested





May 1923Peak 20 .4129.0477 .0024
July 1924 Trough14.4470.0341 ... .0024None
Oct. 1926 Peak 27 .5020.0550 .0020 ... Inverse
Dec. 1927Trough 14.5382.0362 ... .0026Inverse
June 1929Peak 18.5747.0365 .0020 ... Inverse
Mar. 1933Trough45.5277 —.0470 ... .0010Positive
May 1937 Peak 50.4466 —.0811 —.0016 ... Inverse
May 1938 Trough12.4596.0130 ... .0011Inverse
°Three-monthaverage; reference date is middle month.
bBycomparison with preceding rate; e.g., .0024 with .0024.
greater recovery in coach than in Pullman travel. Striking im-
iii coach eq'uipiient
were a contributing factor.
In the remaining phase, 1937—38, coach declined more than
Pullman The cost differential narrowed inthe
South during the contraction, butthis changein price relations
in one region seems too small to account for the relative change in
the national figures.
Although the Pullman travel just considered includes the72 CHAPTER 2
movement of railway employees, while noncommutation passen-
ger-miles do not include any free travel, our remarks with respect
to the differential effect of highway competition and of rate
changes apply primarily to the traffic that pays revenue to both
the railroads and the Pullman Company. The coach component
therefore probably had smaller specific expansions and greater
contractions from 1921 to 1929, smaller contractions and a
larger expansion for 1929 to 1938.
None of these phases, however, tells us anything about the
relative size of the disturbances that would have occurred if
general fluctuations in business had been the sole important
influence. The ratio of Pullman to all other-than-commutation
passenger-miles is not much more helpful. It increased steadily
from 1922 to 1930; no difference between expansion and con-
traction is readily observable in the rate of growth, except in
1937—38 (Chart 3021). The usual computations, it is true, suggest
inverse conformity in 5 of 7 instances (Table 22). They imply
that Pullman tends to be somewhat more stable cyclically than
other traffic. It is not clear, however, that this would be true of
travel by others than railway employees; the goings and comings
of the latter might be sufficiently more stable to account for the
not very large differences in computed rates.22
21 Since no-rail-fare movement is included in the dividend but not the divisor, the
level is somewhat exaggerated throughout.
22 Annual ratios of the number of Pullman to the number of rail passengers, in-
cluding commuters, 1882—1923, do not conform at all to the reference chronology.
Eleven comparisons suggest positive, 12 inverse conformity. If commuters could
be excluded, however, there would probably be more of the latter instances, fewer
of the former.